With the frequent occurrence of natural disasters and the increasing of terrorism, the study of power system resilience has attracted extensive attention. Based on the three stages of the development of different disasters: pre-disaster, during-disaster and post-disaster, this paper proposes a complete assessment framework of power system resilience. It defines the toughness of power system under various types of disasters, the losses caused by disaster, the response ability of power system, the recovery ability and some other concepts or indices, in order to reflect the levels of power system resilience synthetically. IEEE RTS 79 system is tested to verify the effectiveness of the proposed assessment framework. The new framework can measure the robustness and power restoration ability of power system under various disasters, making up the shortcomings of existing resilience assessment methodologies.
INTRODUCTION
Power system has become an indispensable guarantee for the prosperity and development of human race and modern society. As the climate has been changing rapidly in recent years, power system is suffering more disturbances because of extreme natural disasters. For instance, a severe ice storm hit southern China in 2008 [1] , resulting in the failure of 7,541 lines and over 220kV substations. Another example, more than 4 million households' power supply was affected by Japan's earthquake in 2011 [2] . What's more, the U.S. was struck by Hurricane Sandy in 2012 [3] , which led to the destruction of over 100,000 electrical wires and the disconnection of 7 million people.
On the other hand, increasing man-made attacks and terrorist attacks have greatly harmed the secure and stable operation of power system. In 2013, the PG&E substation in the Metcalf of California, USA was shot, causing the breakdowns of 17 transformers and a serious power outage [4] . Nowadays, as the communication and control components have integrated into a whole with power system, the system is more fragile and vulnerable. On ________________________ State Key Laboratory of Electrical Insulation and Power Equipment, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an, Shanxi Province, China 710049 This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (51577147) and Science and Technology Project of State Grid, China (5202011600UG).
December 23, 2015, Ukrainian power grid was attacked through the Internet [5] , and thus about 700,000 residents sustained power outage for several hours.
Under the above circumstance, the resilience of power system has aroused attention of researchers and scholars. Power system resilience can be defined as "the ability of power system to anticipate high-impact low-probability events, rapidly recover from these disruptive contingencies, and absorb lessons for adapting its operation and structure for preventing or mitigating the impact of similar events in future" [6] . In [3] , a conceptual framework for power system resilience is shown, along with critical differences between resilience and power system reliability. Bie [2] presents the concepts, metrics, together with a framework for resilience assessment and summaries hardening strategies and smart grid technologies to increase resilience. Panteli [7] proposes a new risk-based defensive islanding algorithm to mitigate the cascading effects that may occur during weather emergencies.
Nevertheless, existing research focuses more on how to reduce the losses or recover rapidly after disasters, while only a few evaluate the performance of resilience. These assessment frameworks, which are relatively circumscribed, stress more on the potential damage and risk analysis of power system caused by disasters, ignoring the reaction of power system to hazards. The resilience trapezoid is discussed in [8] , based on which Panteli puts forward a resilience metric system called "ΦΛEΠ". In order to overcome the disadvantages of these assessment methods, this paper divides the resilience assessment framework into three modules, which are discussed specifically in Section 2, according to the three stages of disasters: pre-disaster, during-disaster and post-disaster. This framework could completely demonstrate the multi-stage operation levels and robustness of systems during different types of disasters. The assessment framework is applied on IEEE RTS 79 system and tests the resilience of the system under hurricane and lightning respectively.
THREE MODULES OF POWER SYSTEM RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT

Pre-disaster Module
The resilience pre-disaster assessment module consists of "toughness" assessment, that is, the resistance of the power system facing disasters, aiming to analyze the possible damage and losses due to disasters with particular intensity and duration. In a word, pre-disaster assessment module is the core procedure of instructing disaster damage prevention work, resisting the deterioration of power system operation state as well as supporting quick response and recovery after disasters.
Though power systems present varying robustness while faced with different types of disasters, toughness, as inherent of power system, is determined by the power system grid structure, resource allocation and equipment strength, not changing with the variation of the disasters type and intensity. However, characteristics of different extreme events vary greatly; therefore, even the toughness of the same power system will act differently under different climate circumstances. Hence, it is improper to quantify toughness as a fixed constant, like "reactance" or "capacitance"-concrete analysis is needed under specific disasters. This paper refers to the idea of reliability and risk assessment, and the processes of toughness assessment fall into several parts.
1) The identification of disasters features Above all, we should make sure which type of disaster to be considered. The probably affected region, the duration and intensity of disaster should be identified at first. This information is necessary for accurate toughness assessment.
2) The acquisition of the type and the failure possibilities of vulnerable components In this part, we are supposed to assess the impact on system components of different disasters. Determine the damage mechanism on power system of disasters, identify the type of vulnerable components under given disaster and then acquire the failure possibilities of them. For disasters with long time of duration, the failure rates and repair rates of vulnerable components should be acquired to provide sufficient data for obtaining precise assessment results.
3) State sampling of components To mitigate the outage losses, generally timely component repair should be conducted once components are destroyed, especially under relatively long duration disasters, such as hurricane and ice storm. Therefore, the procedure of failure-repair-failure needs to be taken into account. Sequential Monte Carlo, adopting the suitable sampling intervals, is suggested to sample the states of vulnerable components, which will improve the veracity of assessment.
As for earthquake or lightning, the duration of which is short, the component repair work is often not assigned until the end of disaster. Based on this, there is no need to consider the repair work during the period of transient disaster. Nonsequential Monte Carlo is proper for state sampling of components, which will reduce the amount of calculation amount and calculating time of sampling.
4) State analysis of system After obtaining the state of each component, power system state should be analyzed, the algorithm of which is very mature. To reduce the losses of outage, this paper takes the minimum load curtailment as the target and uses Optimal-Power-Flow (OPF) to solve the problem.
5) Toughness assessment and indexes calculation After analyzing the states of system, some indexes should be calculated to reflect the toughness of power system under disasters.
LOLP and EDNS, reliability indicators, are also suitable for toughness concept. They can be obtained from
where N lc indicates the number of load curtailments among the whole simulation times N s , and L lc,i represents the amount of load curtailment in the ith simulation. Average load loss ratio in case of load curtailment (ALRIL), represents the average proportion of load loss to the whole current load demand, which can be calculated as
where L d,i is the power demand of system in the ith simulation.
The probability of components failed during disaster (PCFD) is 
where N c,i is the number of occurrence of components out of work in the ith simulation, and N c indicates the number of the whole components. The noteworthy thing is that PCFD should be calculated according to the types of vulnerable components separately.
The possibility of the occurrence of system islanding (PSI) and isolated note (PIN) can be obtained by (5) and (6) 
where N sy is the number of system islanding and N in denotes the number of isolated nodes among the whole simulation times.
Toughness assessment can depict the running state and robustness of power system under specific disasters effectively. It is the basis and reference of directing the planning and construction of resilient power system, identifying weak components during disaster, reinforcement of power grid and power restoration work.
During-disaster Module
With the continuous progress of smart grid and Energy Internet, power system will be gradually coupled with the information system as a whole. As a consequence, the information of failure detection, load losses and fault location during disaster will be collected and transferred rapidly. Accordingly, resilience assessment in during-disaster module refers to the real-time and online evaluation, as well as the analysis of power system actual running state.
Load loss percent (LLP) presents the load curtailment situation and the power supply capability of power system under disaster destruction. LLP can be calculated by
where L nb,i is the load demand of bus i under normal condition, and L eb,I indicates the actual load amount of bus i under emergency condition, while N b denotes the number of buses.
Components failed percent (CFP), obtained by (8) , shows the components failure degree caused by disaster. The direct cause of blackouts is the malfunction of power system components, which demonstrates the necessity of taking data statistics of CFP. Where N cm denotes the number of faulty components. Just like PCFD, the computation of CFP should be classified by the types of vulnerable components.
The resilience assessment in during-disaster module measures the real running state of system and its resistance to disasters, and provides decision basis for power system emergency control measures as well as component repair dispatch, which emphasizes the importance of this module.
Post-disaster Module
1) The disaster losses assessment The losses assessment after disaster could copy the method in during-disaster module, whose indexes are the same, because the essence of these two parts is similar. Correct assessment of losses can help to calculate the disaster damage to resilient power grid, guide the formulation of response and recovery plans, minimize the risk of the same type disaster in future and draw lessons from this event.
2) The response ability assessment of power system The response ability measures the ability of power system quick action after disasters. A system with fast responsiveness will restore electricity for important load as soon as possible, improving the reliability of power supply dramatically.
The time length from the end of disaster (t ed ) to the start of load restoration (t sl ) (LEDSR) shows the period when the system remains in the post-disaster degraded state. But this metric is limited and conservative. We cannot admit the response ability of a system is good when only a small part of load can recover quickly while the rest remains at low level. So we will define some other metrics.
The ratio of load restoration in one hour after t sl (RLRO):
where L 1h,i denotes the restored load amount of bus i in one hour after t sl . The time length from t ed to when the load of system recovers to the specified proportion, could be represented by t sp . The proportion of load could be designed according to the level of power grid operation and economic or social benefits.
3) The recovery ability assessment of power system In this part we evaluate the ability of power system to recover from the degraded state to the normal operation level. Recovery ability should reflect the effectiveness of recovery strategies and plans, and help assess and compare the pros and cons of different recovery scenarios.
Recovery speed (RS) refers to how fast the load recovers per unit time, which is
where t re is the time when the load recovery process ends. Recovery efficiency (RE) is The load on bus i is divided into ni parts according to load importance. The weight factor of load j on bus i is w ij , while the load loss at t sl is p ij and p ij (t) denotes the real loss of load j on bus i at time t during power restoration. From this point, RE is, in essence, the ratio of losses avoided to maximum losses without recovery.
The above three modules fully describe the core issues to be concerned about during different stages of resilience assessment, and propose a detailed evaluation index system.
CASE STUDY
In this section, the proposed resilience assessment framework is applied to one system: IEEE RTS 79 system [9] .
It is assumed that line 15-24 (58km), line 11-14 (47km), line 12-23(108km), line 11-13 (53km) and line 12-13 (53km) are hit by large-scale hurricane for 5 days and lighting respectively. The system load is 2850 MW (peak load of the system) in the whole assessment process. The resilience is evaluated according to the proposed three modules.
Failure Rate & Repair Time Under Hurricane and Failure Possibility under Lightning
The failure rate and repair time models of transmission lines during high wind can be obtained from [10] , as shown in (12) and (13).
where ω (t) Wind speed at time t; α Scaling parameters; ω crit Critical wind speed over which λ is increased; λ norm Constant failure rate during normal conditions; rt norm Reference restoration time during normal condition; k Repair time growth rate with ω (t) . The failure rate and repair rate models of transmission lines under lightning can be obtained from [10] : However, the line repair work is often assigned after lightning. Hence, the line failure probability can be obtained from (14) and (15) 
Toughness Assessment Result
We assume the test system is located in typical coastal area. The design criteria and mechanical properties of transmission lines are excellent, which help the system to resist the disturbance of hurricane or high wind, so ω crit is set to be 33 m/s (lower limit of the 1 st level hurricane wind speed). ω (t) is assumed to be 56 m/s (lower limit of the 4 th level hurricane wind speed), without changing during the hurricane. By contrast, the toughness of the system hit by lightning (Ng=0.08 occ/h*km 2 ) is also evaluated. Values of above parameters in last part are assigned in Table 1 according to [10] . The toughness assessment results of hurricane condition, lightning condition and normal condition are shown in Table 2 . It can be seen from the comparison of Table 2 that disasters have a significant impact on the power supply reliability. Besides, the toughness of power system against hurricane is better than that against lightning. As mentioned above, the test system has the capability to resist the disturbance of hurricane and thus mitigates the losses. The above analysis shows that the resilience of power system contrasts sharply under different disasters, demonstrating that the concept of the resilience is relative and should not be generalized. For this reason, the assessment of resilience needs to be combined with the types of disasters, not simply to say whether power system resilience is strong or weak.
Losses Assessment Result
The losses assessment during disaster belongs to the scope of on-line and dynamic assessment, whose computation is the same as the method in post-disaster module. So this paper only takes the losses calculation after hurricane for example.
It is assumed that lines 11-13, 11-14, 12-13 and 15-24 are faulty and in repair when hurricane ends, and the system state has become stable. The minimal load curtailment amount is 144 MW, when the load of bus 4 and 9 is cut by 72 MW separately. The losses assessment result is shown in Table 3 . 
Response and Recovery Ability Assessment Result
Due to the length of the paper, only a recovery scheme after Hurricane is given, and post-disaster response ability as well as recovery ability of the system are evaluated. To simplify the process of computation and highlight the core of the proposed algorithm, the load on each bus are split into three categories, according to their importance. The proportion of all kinds of load on each bus is assigned as 10%, 20% and 70%, and the corresponding weight factors are 1.2, 0.8, and 0.3.
Three 4 MW gas-fired generators are placed on bus 4. These generators start in 0.5h (t sl ) after t ed (set to 0), and the load losses will start to decrease at t sl . After 1 hour when gas-fired generators reach the maximum output, 12 MW load will be restored on bus 4. And 4 hours later, line 11-14 will be completely repaired, and the remaining load losses on bus 4 and bus 9 will decline linearly. At that time all load will be supplied normally in 5.5 hours (t re ), and all the damaged transmission lines will return to normal working state 7 hours later.
The time length from t ed to when the load losses decline to 60% of the pre-restoration level is t sp , and it can be considered that the load has been restored steadily.
The response and recovery ability assessment results are presented in table 4 and table 5 . 
CONCLUSION
Resilience of power system has emerged as a novel concept to resist the damage of various disasters. Despite the large body of research, resilience studies available concentrate more on the damage as well as losses forecast and quick load restoration strategies. The paper divides resilience assessment into three modules in accordance with the process of disaster evolution: pre-disaster, during-disaster and post-disaster. A thorough power system resilience assessment framework and a system of evaluation indexes are developed. This framework can evaluate the power system resilience systematically and integrally under different disasters.
It is important to note that the performance level that power system resilience presents under different disasters vary dramatically, which demands that the situation where the resilience is analyzed must be specified, otherwise the essence of resilience will make less sense.
Limited by the length of the paper, some other concepts and indexes are not listed, such as the recovery ability pre-assessment and economic assessment of restoration scenarios. It is the future work of us to supplement and perfect the resilience assessment work constantly.
